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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ALIENS' RIGHTS-THE
THE

REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 AS RESPONSE TO

1967

PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: THE
FIRST TEST

I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1980 President Castro of Cuba announced that he
would permit Cubans who wished to leave the island to do so,
thus setting in motion a string of events that would culminate in
the arrival in the United States of more than 125,000 Cuban refugees by late September.1 On May 5 President Carter announced
an "open heart and open arms" policy for the refugees, 2 and the
following day he declared a state of emergency in the affected areas of Florida and authorized $10 million in relief aid.3 By May 8,
500 Marines and 700 Florida National Guardsmen were needed to
maintain order in the refugee camps. 4 Confronted with pressure
from Congressional leaders to give the Cubans formal refugee status, 5 the possibility that felons and mentally disturbed individuals were among the refugees, s and reports that the total number
of refugees had climbed past 30,000," President Carter announced
that the "Freedom Flotilla" of privately owned boats transporting
refugees from Cuba to the United States was to be discontinued
on pain of fines and criminal sanctions.8 Carter proposed in its
place an official airlift or sealift which would impose some order
on the entry process. In spite of this development, Cuban refugees continued to pour into the United States' and during the
1.

N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1980, at 1, col 2.

2. Id., May 6, 1980, at 1, col 1.
3.

Id., May 7, 1980, at 13, col 1. Two weeks after the shuttle began, approxi-

mately 10,000 Cubans had disembarked in Florida. Id., May 4, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
4.

Id., May 8, 1980, at 12, col. 3.

5. Id., May 13, 1980, at 14, col. 5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
was

Id., May 11, 1980, at 18, col. 1.

Id.
Id., May 15, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1980, at 14, col. 6. According to some reports this
largely because the private boats were forced by Cuban officials to accept
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rest of the summer efforts were concentrated on resettling the refugees and reimbursing local communities for expenses incurred in
accommodating the new arrivals. 10 Meanwhile, the official Cuban
newspaper Granma reported that Castro would not permit Cuban
nationals deported from the United States to reenter Cuba.1" Finally on September 6, President Castro closed the port of Mariel,
thus terminating the Freedom Flotilla by denying the transporting boats access to a safe location for collecting their passengers. 2
This mass migration of Cuban refugees into the United States
began shortly before the May 15, 1980 effective date of the newly
enacted Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act). 13 An emergency situation of intexnational magnitude, therefore, was the occasion of
the first application of the provisions of the new Act which,
among other things, broadened the definition of the term "refugee," and gave the President discretion in unforeseen emergency
situations involving humanitarian or national interests to admit
refugees in numbers beyond the annual quota. The central focus
of this inquiry is the extent to which the United States application of the Refugee Act in the context of its general response to
the crisis accorded with the United States rights and obligations,
if any, under the relevant international conventions: the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol)14 and, by
incorporation, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention). " Reference will also be made to the general
international law on the right of nations to grant and refuse asythe refugees. Id. See also note 37 infra.
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, at 1, col. 3, and Aug. 8, 1980, at 12,

col. 3.
11. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1980, at 21, col. 1. Secretary of State Muskie announced shortly thereafter that the United States would establish as a temporary measure "special detention centers" for those Cubans Castro refused to accept. Id., June 8, 1980, § 22 at 2, col. 1. Several months later, Castro declined to
cooperate with United States efforts to end hijacking attempts by disgruntled
Cuban refugees wishing to return to Cuba. Id., Sept. 17, 1980, at 17, col. 1. Several months later, however, Cuba and the United States entered into talks reportedly covering the possibility of Cuba's repatriation of certain exiles. Id., Dec.
27, 1980, at 5, col. 5.
12. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
13. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

14. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
268 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
15. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as 1951 Convention].
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lum. These and related questions are of particular interest in view
of the fact that the Cuban refugee crisis 6 represented the United
States' first attempt to deal with a sudden mass influx of such
proportions since its efforts to bring the United States immigration laws into closer conformity with the Protocol and
Convention.
II. DoMEsTIc

APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAW

A.

Refugee Act of 1980

The Refugee Act of 1980 went into effect on May 15, 1980, and
thus governs legislation relating to the Cuban refugee situation.
The new Act significantly changed, and was intended primarily to
rectify the shortcomings of, the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (INA) 17 by "provid[ing] a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and
absorption of those refugees who are admitted."1 8 To accomplish
these purposes the Refugee Act established a general admissions
category for refugees, 19 raised the annual quota for admission of
refugees in normal times from 17,400 to 50,000,20 permitted flex-

ibility in the handling of emergency refugee situations,2 limited
the use of the parole authority to a case-by-case determination, 2
and established a separate provision dealing with asylum.23 The
INA, in contrast, provided only for conditional entrant status24 or
temporary entry by parole without a case-by-case determination2 5
and did not have a special classification for political refugees. The
following is a general overview of the major provisions of the new
16. The Haitians who arrived during the same period were involved in a

different set of circumstances and are therefore outside the scope of this
examination.
17. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1252 (1952), as
amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No.

96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
18.

Refugee Act of 1980 § 101.

19. Id. § 207(a)(1).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 207(b).
22. Id. § 203(f)(3).
23. Id. § 208.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a), 1152(e)(7), 1153 (1976).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976).
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Refugee Act.
1. Definition of Refugee
A major innovation in the Refugee Act is the definition of the
term "refugee." The INA did not define "refugee" per se, but it
did establish a separate category for aliens fleeing from, and unwilling or unable to return, because of "persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion,"2 to
any Communist or Communist-dominated area or any country in
the Middle East. The new Refugee Act provides the first statutory definition of "refugee":
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, the
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation ...
may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's
nationality.., and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term
"refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.17

The definition of the term "refugee" expands the INA categories of race, religion, and political opinion to include those persecuted for their nationality or membership in a particular social
group. The addition of these new grounds of persecution may significantly broaden the group of persons considered to be refugees.
The practical effects of this provision are as yet unclear, since the
legal status of the Cuban arrivals has not been determined. Several years before the enactment of the Act, however, in the widely
cited case of Matter of Dunar,the Board of Immigration Appeals
indicated that these two then-omitted classes (those persecuted
for nationality and social group) were "generically similar" to the
classes listed in the INA and that the "distinctions interminology
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(3)(7) (1976).
27. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a).

Summer 1981]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

can be reconciled on a case-by-case consideration as they arise. ' ' 28
Such a view may, however, ignore the ease with which persecution
on the grounds of nationality or membership in a particular social
group can be disguised as enforcement of legitimate domestic law,
thus making it appear distinct from persecution on the grounds of
race, religion, or political opinion. The new provision, at least,
provides an opportunity to unmask such false distinctions.
2. Annual Admission of Refugees and Admission of Emergency
Situation Refugees
Section 207(a)(1) sets a yearly ceiling of 50,000 for refugee admissions in fiscal years 1980-82; after 1982 the President will set
the ceiling after appropriate consultation with Congress. Admissions are to be "allocated among refugees of special humanitarian
concern to the United States in accordance with a determination
made by the President after appropriate consultation." 2
In unforeseen emergency situations in which the admission of
the refugees would be impossible under the teris of section
207(a), but would be justified by grave humanitarian concerns or
the national interest, section 207(b) allows the President, again
after appropriate consultation, to "fix a number of refugees to be
admitted.. . during the succeeding period (not to exceed twelve
months) in response to the emergency refugee situation. .

...0

Further, section 207(c)(1) allows the Attorney General, within the
numerical limitation, to admit a refugee "who is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, is . . .of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and is admissible. . . as an immigrant

under this Act."8 1
The United States has not undertaken any obligation to admit
refugees of any type under the section 207(b) emergency admissions procedures because the terms of the Act are permissible
rather than mandatory.
3. Asylum
Section 208(a) of the Refugee Act provides in part that the At28. Matter of Dunar, BIA Interim Decision No. 2192, Apr. 17, 1973, 14 Administrative Decisions Under Immigration and Nationality Laws, 310, 320-21.
29. Refugee Act of 1980 § 207(a)(1).
30. Id. § 207(b).
31. Id. § 207(c)(1).
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torney General shall establish "a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry,
irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum." 8 If the
alien is determined to be a refugee within the meaning of the Act,
the Attorney General may, at his discretion, grant the asylum.
The Attorney General may terminate the asylum if circumstances
in the refugee's country of nationality change so as to render him
a non-refugee within the meaning of section 201(a).8
4. Withholding of Deportation
Section 203(e), amending section 243(h) of the INA, is a critical
portion of the Refugee Act. Section 243(h), which itself had been
amended previously, read as follows:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien... within the United States to any country in which in his
opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as
he deems it to be necessary for such reason. (Emphasis added.)4
Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act amends the passage as follows:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to

a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a5 particular social

group, or political opinion. (Emphasis added.)3

The new version incorporates the two additional grounds of persecution already discussed in. relation to the definition of "refugee," but more importantly it deprives the Attorney General of
any discretion in the matter if deportation would result in the
alien being subject to a deprivation of freedom.
B.

Official Policy and Efforts to Classify the Cuban
Immigrants Under the New Act

The initial United States response to the gathering of
thousands of Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, beyond
32. Id. § 208(a).

33. Id. § 208(b). Under the terms of the Act, the procedure to be used by the
Attorney General is left to his discretion. Id.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1243(h) (1976).
35. Refugee Act of 1980 § 203(e).

Summer 1981]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

an expectation that the Latin American nations would also offer
asylum to the Cubans,3" was an offer to accept 3,500 of them as
refugees under the President's section 207(b) emergency powers. '
Once that group had arrived, however, and it became clear that
the exodus was quickly achieving major and unexpected proportions, the Administration decided to admit other Cubans on a 60day temporary parole arrangement s in which individuals were to
3
be processed as applicants for asylum on a case-by-case basis. '

The availability of assistance to state and local communities that
were attempting to deal with the influx was a primary concern of
those who invoked the provisions of section 207.40 Such assistance
could most readily be provided under the terms of the new Act
only if the immigrants were classified as refugees.41
On May 5, 1980, President Carter declared that the United
States would welcome the Cubans with "open heart and open
arms." 42 On May 14, after more than 30,000 Cuban refugees had
arrived in southern Florida within the space of a month,43 the
President announced that the United States would end the Freedom Flotilla through the implementation of a five-point program
36. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
37. Id., Apr. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 6.

38. Caribbean Refugee Crisis: Cubans and Haitians: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1980).
39. Id. at 52. The confusion surrounding the status of the refugees during
the first month of the crisis, prior to the effective date of the Refugee Act, led to
the following exchange between Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and Victor Palmieri, the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs:
Kennedy:. . . It seems to me that section 207 [of the Refugee Act of 1980]
applies. The administration ought to use ... the range of benefits for
community support, so that local communities will be given some assurance now, and not under some future action that may or may not be taken
by the Congress or by the Administration, that they will receive some
help.
Palmieri:... It seems clear to us that the act did not contemplate that

for a very good reason. It discriminates between refugees processed abroad
and people who come here as individuals, escape to our shores and seek
asylum. To denominate as refugees people who come here in a sudden,
mass, uncontrolled influx is a very dangerous thing to do.
Id. at 43.
40. Id.
41. Refugee Act of 1980 §§ 411-414.
42. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
43. Id., May 11, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
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that would emphasize treating the Cubans with "decency, fairness, and humanity," and working in cooperation with other na44
tions and with international organizations.
On June 4 the Carter Administration consulted with Congress
as it was required to do under the Refugee Act, and was informed
that Congressional leaders felt there was no likelihood that Congress would pass legislation clarifying the legal status of the refugees.4 5 On June 17, the Senate approved by voice vote two
amendments to a bill authorizing $100 million to state and local
governments trying to cope with the crisis; these amendments
stated that the Cubans would be considered refugees only for the
purposes of the legislation, and required the President to report
to Congress by July 1 on the legal status of the refugees.46 Subsequently, on June 20, the Administration announced that the
Cubans and certain Haitians already in the country would receive
a temporary classification entitled "Cuban/Haitian Entrants (status 4pending),"
which would entitle them to certain welfare bene7
fits.

The parole granted earlier was also extended for six

months,48 which apparently meant that the entrants status was
invoked with the parole authority of section 203(f)(3) of the new
44. President's Statement, May 14, 1980, reprintedin 80 DEP'T STATE BuLL.
70 (June 1980). The proposed program included (1) an airlift and sealift from
Cuba to the United States and other countries for persons screened before departure; (2) the opening of a new family registration center in Miami; (3) a prohibition on trips to Cuba by unauthorized boats, with violators being subject to
fines and criminal prosecution; (4) exclusion proceedings for criminals and
others who pose a danger to the United States; and (5) consultation with international organizations and other countries to decide on relief measures that
might be taken by the international community. Id. In spite of the strict sanctions applied to private boats that continued to make the crossing, the Freedom
Flotilla continued until Castro terminated it in late September. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 27, 1980, at 1, col. 2. During the interim period some captains of fishing
boats had charged that Cuban officials threatened to seize their vessels if they
did not accept refugees, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1980, at 14, col. 1, and there had
been increasing dissatisfaction with the fact that criminals and other undesirables were among those arriving in Florida. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 9,
1980, at 13, col. 2.
45. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1980, at 21, col. 1. On the same day, Granma, the
official Cuban newspaper, reported that Cuba would not take back criminals deported by the United States. Id.
46. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
47. White House Fact Sheet, June 20, 1980, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 81 (August 1980).
48. Id.
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Act, and the Administration expressed its hope that those Cubans
permitted to remain could, with Congress' approval, become permanent United States residents after two years. 49 Aliens arriving
after June 19 would be considered for asylum on a case-by-case
basis according to the terms of section 208(a), but those arriving
illegally would be subject to "exclusion or deportation in accordance with U.S. immigration laws.""0 In the meantime, the Administration planned to ask Congress to establish a special "Cuban/Haitian Entrant" status for "recently arrived Cubans and
Haitians."' The Cubans and Haitians who were already in the
country should be treated as a group rather than screened individually, reportedly because the latter route would be "too cumbersome and time consuming. ' 'sa The Administration declined to
request that these people be classified as refugees partly because
the Act's asylum procedures were not intended to accommodate
mass migrations, and such classification might "compromis[e] the
integrity" of the definition of "refugee" established in the Act by,
in effect, rewarding illegal immigrants.53 One Administration official was quoted as saying that classifying the aliens as refugees
and thereby according them full refugee benefits would have the
effect of encouraging other aliens to try to enter the United
States illegally." President Carter subsequently extended the
Cubans' temporary special status to July 15, 1981. 5 At the present time, the questions surrounding the status of the Cubans
persist unresolved.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Introduction
The sources of international law used in this analysis include
those set out in the Statute of International Court of Justice: 56
49. Id.
50. Id. at 81-82.

51. Id. at 81.
52. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
53. Interview with John Klekas of the State Department Cuban Refugee

Task Force, reprinted in Cuban Refugee Crisis: Quick Test for New Law, 66
ABA J. 826 (1980).
54. Statement of Eugene Eidenberg, President Carter's Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, at 1, col. 3.

55. Id., Jan. 13, 1981, § 2, at 7, col. 1.
56. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1).
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conventions, custom, principles of law, judicial decisions, and
teachings of the publicists. 17 Because the United States has ratified the 1967 Protocol, which incorporates the 1951 Convention, 8
those agreements provide the focus of this discussion. Under the
general internatiorial rule of pacta sunt servanda, a treaty is
binding on the parties to it.5 1Arguably, however, the inclusion of
a particular provision in a convention, or even a number of conventions, does not in itself establish the provision as an accepted
principle of international law. 0
B. Right of a State to Grant Asylum to Refugees
The right of a state to grant asylum at its discretion has been
long recognized in international law.6 1 This sovereign right is implicit in the terms of many of the binding and non-binding multilateral agreements, conventions, and resolutions on the treatment
and status of refugees.62 A theoretical limitation on this right to
57. These sources of international law are listed in this order in the Statute.
The order reflects the weight the Court gives to each source in its determinations. Note that the terms of conventions are the most persuasive.
58. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
59. See, e.g., the International Law Commission's Commentary on Article 55
of the ILC draft on the "Law of Treaties", U.N. Doc. A/CN.41L.106/Add. 3, July
17, 1964, cited in Whiteman, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (1965).
60. Cf. J. MOORE, Progressof InternationalLaw in this Century, in II COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BAssErT MOORE 439, 445 (1944), reprinted from The

Nineteenth Century 18-31 (1901), cited in Whiteman, 1

DIGEST

OF INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW 70 (1965).

61. As early as the eighteenth century Vattel said,
Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country,
when he cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger, or
doing a manifest injury. What it owes to itself, the care of its own safety,
gives it this right; and, in virtue of its natural liberty, it belongs to the
nation to judge whether its circumstances will or will not justify the admission of the foreigner.
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 19, § 230 (1817).
62. E.g., Article 1(1) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 14 December 1967, G.A. Res. 2203, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967) states, "Asylum granted by a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to
persons entitled to invoke article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights... shall be respected by all other States." (Emphasis added.) Article 14
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of December 19, 1948 (A/RES/
217 (III)) states: "(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of
persecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to
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grant asylum can be found in the definition of "refugee" provided
in the 1951 Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol.6 According to Article l(A)(2), a refugee is one who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of [sic] a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it."
Thus, an individual seeking haven from persecution for reasons
other than those listed above could not properly be considered a
refugee. Further, under traditional rules of international law, the
terms of other treaties between the refugee's state of nationality
and the receiving state may affect that individual's status as a
65
refugee.
The language of the Preamble to the 1951 Convention impliedly supports the contention that the state has a right to grant
asylum by conspicuously failing to qualify that right: "The high
contracting parties,. . . considering that the grant of asylum may
place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries.
... 6
It is generally accepted, however, that while a nation may freely
exercise its sovereign right to grant asylum, it is under no obligation to do so. The failure of the conventions on the subject to
identify any such obligation underscores the permissive nature of
grants of asylum. Accordingly, the right of a nation to provide

the purposes and principles of the United Nations."
63. Protocol, supra note 14, at 268. The fact that sixty-seven nations are
parties to the Protocol demonstrates the widespread acceptance of the definition. [1977] 31 Y.B.U.N. 621.
64. 1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. l(A)(2).
65. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTFRNATiONAL LAW, 104
(1972). Atle Grahl-Madsen is a leading writer on the subject of refugees in international law.
66. 1951 Convention, supra note 15, at Preamble.
67. The Immigration and Naturalization Service apparently concurs with
this interpretation of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. "The United Nations Convention and Protocol... relates to the treatment of refugees who are

actually in the territory of the contracting state. It does not compel a contracting state to receive refugees .

. . ."

Admission of Refugees Into the United

States: HearingsBefore the Subcom. on Immigration,Citizenship and Interna-
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refuge does not vest the individual asylum-seeker with the right
to be granted asylum, which is the natural corollary of a state's
obligation to grant asylum. Many international conventions on
the subject reject the notion that a refugee has a "right" to asylum. Article 1(3) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1967, recognizes each state's sovereignty with regard to granting asylum but
implicitly rejects the notion of a "right" to be given asylum: "It
shall rest with the State granting asylum to evaluate the grounds
for the grant of asylum." 8 Nor does the 1951 Convention contain
any reference to a right to be granted asylum.
It has been argued, however, that international law is now so
consistent that is confers the right of asylum on the individual.'
The theory is that the "main stumbling block" to the recognition
of the individual's right of asylum is disagreement over the elements and application of this right.7 0 Even though states do not
recognize a right of asylum,
[i]t is no accident that the asylum seeker came to be the individual
first and foremost recognized as needing a status transcending the
laws of any State. In effect, the law on asylum can be described as
the earliest and most effective attempt towards an application of
human rights and a recognition of the international status of cer-

tain individuals. Consequently, the refugee is the subject of international law par excellence."'

The notion that the individual may have a right to asylum in
international law remains outside the mainstream of international
law doctrine.72
tional Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,Part ]I, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 236 (1978) (statement of Leonel Castillo).
68. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 62, at art. 1(3).
69. Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of InternationalLaw, 15 INr'L & CoMP.
L.Q. 90, 94 (1966) (quoting Sir John Salmond's definition of the proper subject
of law: "A juridical person is any being whom the law regards as capable of
rights and duties.").
70. Id. at 105. Krenz cites ancient writers, judicial decisions, resolutions of
international organizations, and international conventions in support of his
thesis.
71. Id. at 115.
72. The United States has failed to ratify documents containing language
which may indicate some movement toward establishing a right of asylum for
the individual. As early as 1948 this seemingly radical concept was set out in
article XXVII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in

Summer 1981]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The refusal to recognize such a right is grounded in the notion
that, under international law, refugees
are not considered subjects of international rights and obligations
...

Most of the rules from which individuals may benefit have

been construed as conferring rights not on the individual but on
the State to whom he belongs ...

[I]f individuals possess inter-

national rights and/or duties or even international procedural capacity, this is by virtue of international conventions."
Under this analysis, the law of asylum encompasses the behavior
of states rather than individuals. The omission of the concept of
the individual's right of asylum from the Convention and Protocol more accurately reflects international law at the present time.
The right to asylum has not been widely adjudicated in the
courts, but the existing cases adhere to the viewpoint that the
granting of asylum is discretionary on the part of the receiving
state. The United States Supreme Court early on expressed its
willingness to abide by "the accepted maxims of international
law, [that] every sovereign nation has the power, inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance
of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
1
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. '
This same view was echoed by the International Court of Justice
in Judge Alvarez' celebrated dissenting opinion in the Asylum
Case:7 "[lit is the state from which asylum is requested that
must decide whether it wishes to grant it or not."
the Final Act of the 9th International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Columbia: "Every person has the right, in case of pursuit not resulting from
ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance
with the laws of each country and with international agreements." (Emphasis
added.) Similarly, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Official Recs. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/I.I, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2, Jan. 7, 1970 states in
article 22(7): "Every person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a
foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and international
conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political offenses or related
common crimes." (Emphasis added.) Although limited by their terms to application in accordance with existing municipal law and relevant conventions, these
provisions indicate at least some willingness to consider the individual as being
vested with a right of asylum and therefore, by extension, the state as having a
duty to grant asylum.
73. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 65, at 57.
74. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
75. [1950] I.C.J. 266.
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Nations are understandably reluctant to relinquish sovereignty
in a matter that, for very practical rea3ons, traditionally has been
within their discretion. The movement of a population group can
effect major upheavals in the social, political, and economic order
of a receiving nation, and can be orchestrated by the state of the
refugee's nationality for self-serving reasons. Issues such as the
portion of the burden to be carried by the nation as a whole or by
each state in a federal system and the terms under which the refugees will be admitted, are properly determined by the receiving
nation. The various factors entering into a country's decision to
accept or reject asylum-seekers are inherently self-serving and nationalistic, and do not lend themselves to impartial appraisal by
other nations or even an international organization. On the other
hand, it is legitimate to ask at what point municipal law and the
humanitarian principles reflected in the practice of states converge to form a generally accepted principle of international
law-in this case the obligation of states to grant asylum or the
right of the individual to be granted asylum.
C. Right of the State to Expel Refugees Within the Territory
of the State
Articles 32 and 33 of the :1951 Convention govern the right of
signatory states to expel refugees. Article 32 states in part: "1.
The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their
territory save on grounds of national security or public order.",0
And article 33, to which no reservation may be made,77 provides
in part: "1. No Contracting State shall expel or return
("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of [sic] a
76. Article 32 continues in part:
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling
reasons of national security otherwise require ....
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period

within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal
measures as they may deem necessary.
1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. 32.
77. The fact that each signatory nation must agree to the terms of article 33

as written is significant because it indicates the centrality of this provision to
the entire Convention and the importance placed upon it by signatory nations.
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particular social group or political opinion."7 8 The Convention
distinguishes between refugees "lawfully in the territory" of the
contracting state and those who have not gained lawful admission
to the state. According to article 32(1), a refugee lawfully in the
territory may be expelled only on grounds of national security or
public order. Article 33(1), on the other hand, expresses the principle of non-refoulement in providing that no refugee shall be returned to a nation which will persecute him on his return; the
provision applies to all refugees, whether or not lawfully admitted, who do not pose a threat to national security or a criminal
threat to the community. Thus, a refugee who simply arrives in a
nation and has not been duly admitted may be expelled but may
not be returned to a persecuting nation unless he falls within one
of the stated exceptions. A lawfully admitted refugee who does
not represent a threat to the national security may be expelled
only after "a decision reached in accordance with due process of
law"7 9 but even then he may not be returned to a persecuting
nation.
The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant),8 0 which the United States has not ratified, provides
in article 13 that "[a]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State
Party to the present Convention may be expelled therefrom only
in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law
....
"81 The Covenant clearly applies only to individuals lawfully
in the territory of the receiving state, and applies to refugees and
all other aliens. It also requires due process but, conspicuously,
does not prohibit refoulement. Article 13 should be read in conjunction with article 5(2), however, which states that nothing in
the Covenant "derogates from any of the fundamental human
rights recognized or existing in any State Party. .. pursuant to

78. Article 33 continues:
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to
the security of the country in which he is or who, having been convicted by
a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.
1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. 33.
79. See note 76 supra.
80. Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966, U.N.
Publ. OPI246 (1966).
81. Id. art. 13.
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law, conventions,. . . or custom ...."82 In contrast, article 22 of
the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights does not require that the alien be legally within the territory of the receiving
state:
In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that
country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being
violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or
political opinions.8
Article 22 reaffirms the principle of non-refoulement consistently
with article 33 of the 1951 Convention, though it provides for no
exceptions to the principle, and is not limited by its terms to
refugees.
The Declaration on Territorial Asylum contains a similar provision in article 3(1):
No person [entitled to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights] shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in
which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any
State where he may be subjecLed to persecution. "
Article 3(2) specifies that an exception may be made "only for
overriding reasons of national security or in order to safeguard
the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons."85 The
wording of article 3(1) expands the concepts expressed in the
1951 Convention by referring to "rejection at the frontier"; the
phrase indicates an intention to extend the right of non-refoulement to individuals who are not yet within the territory Pf the
receiving state. The clear implication of this is that the receiving
state has a duty to accept these aliens. 88
Concern with the possibility of expulsion facing the refugee at
the border, or illegally within the territory of a receiving state,
was an impetus behind article 31(1) of the 1951 Convention,
which states:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. art. 5(2).
1969 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 72, at art. 22.
1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 62, at art. 3(1).
Id. art. 3(2).
86. See II A. GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 65, at 102.
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from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to
the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence." 1
With article 33(1), this provision provides virtually complete protection for the refugee fleeing to the receiving state without the
benefit of the usual preliminary legal formalities.
Whether the principle of non-refoulement has achieved the status of a general principle of international law is a subject of disagreement.8 7 Nevertheless, the notion that the cumulative value of
resolutions and declarations of international organizations are
persuasive evidence of customary international law does have
support, as evidenced by Judge Tanaka's celebrated dissenting
opinion in the South-West Africa Cases:88
What is required for customary international law is the repetition
of the same practice; . . . resolutions, declarations, etc., on the
same matter in the same, or diverse, organizations must take place
repeatedly... This collective, cumulative and organized process
of custom-generation can be ... seen to have an important role
from the viewpoint of the development of the international law.8'
IV. Dm THE UNITED STATES BEHAVIOR IN THE CUBAN REFUGEE
CRISIS CONFORM WITH ITS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW?

A.

The Terms of the Refugee Act of 1980

The United States rights and obligations towards refugees
under international law are most clearly defined by the terms of
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Accession to the Protocol
did not, however, either diminish the sovereignty of the United
States by granting new rights to aliens, 90 or alter the pre-1980

86.1.

1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. 31(1).

87. See, e.g., G. GooDwiN-GmL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVMNT OF
PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 141 (1978) and R. PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW

244 (1972).

88. [1966] I.C.J. 248.
89. Id. at 291-93.
90. See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, rehearing denied 551 F.2d
863, cert. granted 434 U.S. 962, on remand 570 F.2d 95 (1977).
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terms of the INA. 1 While the language of the Refugee Act was
intended to9 2 and does bring the INA into closer conformity with

the Protocol, there is no evidence to indicate that this change was
motivated by a belief that it was required by that agreement. Indeed, Congress could have passed legislation inconsistent with the
terms of the Convention and Protocol if it had wished to do so.9 3
1. Definition of "Refugee"
The definition of "refugee" contained in section 201(a) of the
new Act embraces the definition contained in Article l(A)(2) of
the 1951 Convention, and goes beyond it to include certain persecuted individuals who are still within the country of their nationality. Also, expanding the definition of persecution to include oppression based on nationality and membership in a particular
social group brings the definition into conformity with the Convention, although the practical effect of this change is as yet unclear. The exclusion of persons who have themselves participated
in persecution from this definition of "refugee" is consonant with
article l(F)(c) of the Convention, which excludes from its purview
persons who have been "guilty of acts9 4contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.

2. Annual Admission of Refugees and Admission of Emergency
Situation Refugees
Section 207, which sets a normal yearly ceiling on refugee admissions and provides for emergency admissions by the President,
is an exercise of the United States sovereign right to use discretion in granting asylum, a right implicitly recognized in the Preamble to the 1951 Convention and under general international
91.

"[A]ccession does not in any sense commit the contracting state to en-

large its immigration measures for refugees ....

The Attorney General will be

able to administer [the deportation provisions of the Immigration and National-

ity Act] in conformity with the Protocol without amendment of the Act." Protocol Relating to Refugees, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (testimony before the Sen-

ate Committee on Foreign Relations by Laurence A. Dawson, Acting Deputy
Director of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State)
(Appendix: Executive Report No. 14 at 6).
92. See note 105 infra.
93. Congress may constitutionally pass legislation inconsistent with United
States treaty obligations. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951).
94. 1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. 1(F)(c).
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law. United States law does not vest in individual refugees any
right to be granted asylum; 5 even if domestic law did create such
rights it would not create any binding international obligation because under traditional public international law the individual
has no such rights.
3. Asylum
Section 208(a) provides that the Attorney General shall establish the procedure by which an alien within the territory or at a
border may apply for asylum. The persuasive Declaration on Territorial Asylum states in article 1(3) that "[i]t shall rest with the
State granting asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of
asylum."96 This provision of the Refugee Act is also consonant
with the principle of general international law that each state has
complete sovereignty in deciding whether to grant asylum. The
termination of asylum provision is consistent with article 1(c)(5)
of the 1951 Convention which states that the "Convention shall
cease to apply to any [refugee] if.

.

. [he] can no longer, because

the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail
himself of the protection of his country of nationality"9 8 unless he
shows that he should not be returned for reasons relating to his
previous persecution. The Refugee Act does not clearly provide
for this exception, but the use of the word "may" rather than
"shall" in section 208(b) indicates that the exception stated in the
1951 Convention also exists under the Refugee Act.
4. Withholding of Deportation
Section 203(e) amends the INA to deprive the Attorney General of any discretion as to whether to deport an alien facing persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion." Prior to the new
enactment, United States courts frequently grappled with the issue of the amount of discretion the Attorney General could exercise consistent with the terms of the Protocol. In one landmark
95.
96.
97.
98.

See note 80 supra.
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 62, at art. 1(3).
See text accompanying notes 61-75 supra.
1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. 1(c)(5).
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case, 99 the Court ruled on Haitian petitioners' claim that they
should not be deported because they would be subject to political
persecution upon return to Haiti. In an opinion referring to an
Amnesty International report on political conditions on the island
at that time, the Court held that the immigration judge may have
erred in his view that the petitioners would not be subjected to
political persecution. The Court acknowledged the importance of
the Protocol but stated that it had "not yet decided whether the
Protocol restricts the Attorney General's discretion to refuse to
stay deportation when he 100
has determined that an alien would face
persecution if deported."
The question of the extent of the Attorney General's power appears to have been resolved because the language of the new provision is consistent with the principle of non-refoulement
ascribed to in article 33(1) of the Convention. This resolution occurred because of a deliberate effort to conform domestic law
with the Convention; the legislative history to the Refugee Act
indicates that "[tihe Conference substitute adopts the House provision with the understanding that it is based directly on the language of the Protocol and that it is intended that the provision be
construed consistent with the Protocol." 1 '
The Refugee Act excludes from the provisions of section
243(h)(1) those aliens who have participated in one of the five
specified types of persecution of another person, who have been
convicted of a serious crime and therefore "constitute a danger to
the. . . United States," who are suspected of pre-arrival "serious
nonpolitical crimes," or who are considered upon "reasonable
grounds" to be a "danger to the security of the United States." 102
The second, third, and fourth of these grounds for deportation
fall within the scope of the general language of article 33(2) of the
Conventin:
The benefit of the present provision may not ...

be claimed by a

99. Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 559 F.2d 997 (5th Cir.
1977).
100. Id. The Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969) similarly left the issue unaddressed: "[I]t is premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances, an order of deportation
might contravene the Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded on November 1, 1968." Id. at 80 n.22.
101. H.R. Rep. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1980).
102. Refugee Act of 1980 § 203(e).
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refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is or who, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.105
Arguably, the first ground for deportation, participation in the
persecution of another person, is consonant with article l(F)(c) of
the Convention (as was the exception to the definition of "refugee" expressed in the Refugee Act) which excludes persons who
have been "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations. '" 04
Though it is not clear whether the principle of non-refoulement
has achieved the status of a principle of general international law,
the new provision does accord with the theory of non-refoulement. If the United States follows the letter of the law in practice, it will contribute significantly to establishing non-refoulement as customary international law.
B.

United States Response to the Crisis in Light of the
Relevant InternationalLaw
1.

Were the Cubans Technically Refugees?

The first question to be asked in examining the United States
response to the Cuban refugee crisis, in light of the Convention
and Protocol, is whether the incoming Cubans were refugees as
that term is defined in the Convention. To qualify, each refugee
must have left Cuba because of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
[sic] a particular social group or political opinion,"10 5 and be unable or unwilling to return to Cuba for that same reason.
Social and political events in recent Cuban history indicate
widespread intolerance of various groups and individuals. The
Castro regime permitted only certain Cubans to leave the island
during the refugee "crisis." The space in each boat transporting
the refugees to the United States was allocated one-third to relatives of Cubans already in the United States, one-third to Cubans
who had been waiting in the Peruvian Embassy to leave, and the
final third to members of groups of which Castro wanted to rid

103. 1951 Convention, supra note 15, at art. 33(2).
104. Id. art. 1(F)(c).
105. Id. art. 1(A)(2).

582

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14.561

the island-including political dissidents.106 This last group included persons who had been released from prison so that they
could leave Cuba. 107 Intolerance of political dissidence in Cuba
appears to have been a hallmark of the Castro regime. When he
came to power in 1959, Castro abolished all political parties except the Partido Communista de Cuba (PCC), which has been
characterized as an integral part of the government 08 as opposed
to an independent political party. There have been no free elections in Cuba since 1959,109 and in the first ten years alone of

Castro's rule 500,000 people fled the island, a figure equivalent to
eight percent of Cuba's population in 1959.

°

Because of these factors and because Castro refused to repatriate any of these immigrants, 1 1 it might be inferred that many of
those so eager to leave Cuba would be subject to persecution upon
their return. The Administration's choice of the relatively ambiguous "Cuban-Haitian Entrant" status may indicate that it was
not persuaded by the threat of future recrimination against the
would-be immigrants. Perhaps the Administration's position was
less a comment on its perception of political and social conditions
in Cuba than a comment on its desire to balance an attitude of
compassion for the Cubans against a policy of discouraging technically illegal immigrants. The United States reluctance to place
the Cubans in the "refugee" category is less important than the
fact that it did admit these individuals despite the traditional
rule of international law that states are not obligated to grant
106. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980, at 2E, col. 1.
107. United States officials reportedly said at the time that "the overwhelming majority of them have been imprisoned for so-called 'antisocial' and 'antirevolutionary' offenses such as attempting to flee Cuba, refusing to work and
criticizing or actively opposing the Castro regime." Id. at 18L, col. 1.
108. H. BLUTSTEIN, ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR CUBA, 237 American Univer-

sity Foreign Area Studies (1971).
109. Id. at 229.
110. Id. at 64. The International Commission of Jurists stated only a few
years after Castro came to power: "The legal guarantees of freedom, life, and
property have been eliminated. The state has become a monolithic dictatorship
that relentlessly directs or ends the citizen's life as it sees fit with no restraints
or regard for the rights or dignity of the individual. International Commission of
Jurists, Cuba and the Rule of Law (1962), cited in BLUTSTEIN, supra note 108.
One of the most respected international human rights organizations, Amnesty
International, has repeatedly expressed its concern over the plight of political
prisoners in Cuba. See, e.g., Amnesty International Rep. 1979, London.
111. See note 11 supra.
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asylum. Since the final determination of the legal status of the
Cubans has not been resolved it is too early to ascertain precisely
the official United States position on their admission and on the
conditions under which they may remain in the United States.
2.

Asylum and Non-Refoulement

Nomenclature aside, the admission of the Cubans was a legitimate exercise of the United States sovereign discretion in granting asylum to refugees. The immediate response of the United
States, both in accepting the Cubans and in calling for the cooperation of other nations, was extremely positive, and consistent
with this country's tradition of accepting refugees from other nations, particularly nations under Communist influence. When the
sheer impact of the immigration movement and the risks of the
crossing between Cuba and Florida became clear, however, the
Administration decided to terminate its support of the Freedom
Flotilla and propose instead a more orderly official refugee transportation program.112 This was not tantamount to a decision to
refuse to accept the Cubans; on the contrary, Carter immediately
proposed specific procedures for admitting the immigrants, 1 and
those who continued to arrive were processed as their predecessors had been. Thus, the United States merely exercised its right
to grant asylum in the manner in which it saw fit. Nor was the
action tantamount to a violation of article 33 of the Convention,
since none of the refugees were returned to Cuba. An attempt was
made to return the criminals and other undesirable immigrants
but Cuba, in violation of established principles of international
law, announced that it would refuse to accept them.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Refugee Act of 1980, reflecting United States commitments
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, went into effect during a wave of immigration that created a state of emergency in strongly affected southern Florida. Under a severe test of
its commitment to the terms of the 1967 Protocol and its implicit
sense of moral obligation to grant asylum to individuals fleeing
dictatorial rule, the United States responded positively in accepting the Cubans. Although the Administration undoubtedly
112. President's Statement, supra note 44.
113.

N.Y. Times, June 5, 1980, at 21, col. 1.
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did not intend by its treatment of the Cubans to lend credence to
the theory that the individual has a right to asylum, its behavior,
at least with respect to those Cubans who actually arrived in
southern Florida, was consistent with that theory. The policy and
actions of the United States, however, can be analyzed only in
view of the emergency situation created by the influx. It is conceivable that the United States might have pursued other alternatives had the wave of immigration occurred more slowly.
More problematic, perhaps, is the refusal of the Administration
to categorize the Cuban immigrants as refugees under the new
definition set out in section 201(a). As noted, it is unlikely that
this posture reflects a belief that most of these people would not
be subject to some kind of persecution on their return to Cuba.
The decision to treat the Cubans arriving after June 19 as applicants for asylum is consistent with the provisions of the Refugee
Act. Whether that decision, and the decision to establish a "Cuban/Haitian Entrants" status for those aliens who had arrived
before June 19th, violate the spirit the of the Act's provisions for
admission of refugees of special humanitarian concern during unforeseen emergency refugee crises is a matter of interpretation.
The overall question, therefore, appears to be not whether the
Refugee Act of 1980 accords with the terms of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and with the general international law
on the subject, but whether the handling of the Cuban refugee
crisis, though consistent with principles of international law, was
also in harmony with the intent of the Act and, by extension, the
Protocol.
Gali Hagel

JURISDICTION-FOREIGN DEFENDANTS AND THEIR DEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS: AN APPLICATION OF WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V.
WOODSON
I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent Supreme Court decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson1 articulated limits imposed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment on state court exercise of in personam jurisdiction. World-Wide signaled a halt to a
trend of expanding state court jurisdiction that began with the
1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 which
laid waste to old mechanical notions of in personam jurisdiction
and stressed a new due process analysis based on fairness. The
World-Wide decision clarifies the Burger Court's position that
the defendant's relation to the forum state is determinative on
the issue of whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with
due process. Recent products liability litigation involving foreign
corporate defendants emphasizes the Supreme Court's focus on
the defendant's activities on questions of the constitutional scope
of personal jurisdiction; yet, despite the language in World-Wide,
federal court decisions have not resulted in a major jurisdictional
advantage for foreign defendants whose products have penetrated
the United States commercial arena. Indeed, more Supreme
Court decisions are needed to guide the courts in applying WorldWide to the transnational legal arena; World-Wide's basic limitations on a state's assertion of jurisdiction are a result of the
Burger Court's emphasis on federalism, an emphasis difficult to
square with the myriad commercial and constitutional concerns
inherent in commercial dealings with foreign nations.
11.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Due Process Liturgy of International Shoe, McGee,
and Hanson
Federal courts considering claims against foreign defendants
must first determine if jurisdiction exists. Modem jurisdictional
theory for domestic cases originated with the Supreme Court's
1.
2.

444 U.S. 286 (1980).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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evaluation in International Shoe of the doctrines established in
Pennoyer v. Neff.3 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court emphasized
the concept of state territoriality" to justify assertions of jurisdiction based on a party's presence or property ownership in the
forum state.8 International Shoe8 undermined Pennoyer's presence test 7 in favor of an analysis emphasizing defendant's social
relations" with the forum and the concept of fairness:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'9
The InternationalShoe Court suggested that a qualitative analysis10 grounded in equitable principles11 must be used to determine
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. "The basic premise of Pennoyerwas that the states are independent sovereigns, which interact as do foreign nations. Justice Field ...thought it impossible that the states could be other than independent adjudicatory bodies. They
could not be mere parts of a coordinated whole." Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New JurisdictionalTheory, 15 GA. L. REv. 19, 30
(1980). For an excellent discussion of Pennoyer, its justification and rationale,
see also Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction,1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 241.

5. "[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property
within its territory .... [N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." 95 U.S. at 722.
6. In International Shoe, plaintiff Commissioner was authorized under a
Washington statute to issue employees a notice of assessment of delinquent contributions to an unemployment compensation till. Plaintiff served process on a
salesperson of International Shoe Company, a Delaware corporation that had no
authority to make contracts in Washington, had no office or merchandise status
in the state, and employed only eleven to thirteen employees in the state. The
Washington Supreme Court found that "regular and systematic solicitation of
orders in the state by appellant's salesmen, resulting in a continuous flow of
appellant's product in the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business in
the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit ... ." 326 U.S. at 313-14.
7. "To say that the corporation is so far 'present' there as to satisfy due
process requirements ...

is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms

'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy
the demands of due process." 326 U.S. at 316-17.
8. See generally Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 383 (1979).
9. 326 U.S. at 316.
10. "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line be-
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the propriety of asserting jurisdiction. Qualitative analysis involves a weighing of all the relevant factors peculiar to each case
in order to determine whether exercising jurisdiction violates due
process. The Court's dictum suggested that the convenience to
the out-of-state defendant in having to litigate in the forum state
is a factor to be included in this due process calculus. 12
This notion of convenience to the defendant surfaced again
twelve years later in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,13
in which the Supreme Court allowed California's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company "based on a
contract which had substantial connection" with California.1 4 Jus-

tice Black acknowledged that the modernization of transportation
facilities, communication, and national commerce eliminated any
unfairness in subjecting an out-of-state corporate defendant to jurisdiction in a state in which the defendant had been involved in
economic activity.1 5 In addition to this idea of convenience, the
Court stressed that the interest of the forum state in adjudicating
tween those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and
those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative." Id. at 319.
11. "The InternationalShoe decision... permits the assumption of jurisdiction over any matter that bears a reasonable and substantial connection to
the forum community." Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1147 (1966).

12. 326 U.S. at 317.
13. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, plaintiff, beneficiary of decedent's life
insurance policy which had been purchased by mail in California from a Texas
corporation, sued the Texas corporation for refusal to pay out on the insurance
contract. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment in California. In Texas, the court
refused to enforce her judgment and held it void because service of process
outside California could not subject the Texas defendant to California's jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court reversed despite the fact that neither
the Texas corporation nor an Arizona corporation whose insurance obligations
had been assumed by the Texas corporation had any office in California or had
ever done any other business there. Id. at 224.
14. Id. at 223.
15. Justice Black explained that there had been a
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more states and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With the increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic activity.
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claims for its residents was another factor in its due process
analysis.18
A year after InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court in Hanson

v. Denckla17 found Florida's exercise of jurisdiction over a Delaware trust company unconstitutional. The Hanson court said that
an assertion of jurisdiction consistent with due process requires
"that there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws."1 8 The Supreme Court was concerned about advocating a
demise to the "territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." 19 McGee had already minimized the use of these territorial restrictions on assertions of jurisdiction by focusing on the
plaintiff, the forum's interests, and the technological advances

that decreased the burden on litigating in distant forums. 20 Jus16. "It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents ... [who] would be at a severe disadvantage if... forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in
order to hold it legally accountable." Id.
17. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). One of the issues in Hanson was whether Florida
had jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee who was given power pursuant to a
trust created in Delaware by decedent before her death. Decedent was domiciled
in Florida before her death; therefore, when her will was probated in Florida, it
was found that the power of appointment over the remainder interest in the
trust assets was invalid under Florida law. A Delaware court subsequently refused to accord full faith and credit to the Florida Supreme Court's decision
that the appointment was invalid. The Delaware court found that Florida had
no personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee who was an indispensible
party under Florida law. Id. at 243.
18. Id. at 253.
19. Id. at 250-51. Justice Warren explained:
In McGee the Court noted the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents .... But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts .... However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has the
"minimal contacts" with that state that are a prerequisite to its exercise of
power over him.
Id.
20. See notes 15 & 16 supra. Professor Kamp suggests that the McGee and
Hanson decisions resulted in two different interpretations of International
Shoe. He notes that courts following Hanson examined the physical and business contacts of each defendant and the forum state. "Under... [McGee], a
defendant's individual contacts were not regarded as determinative. Rather, the
courts weighed ... the regulatory concerns of the state, the convenience of the
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tice Warren's opinion distinguished McGee from Hanson on the
ground that the former involved a cause of action arising from the
out-of-state defendant's activity in the forum state (the solicitation of the insurance agreement with the California resident),
whereas Hanson "disclose[d] no instance in which the [Delaware]
trustee performed any acts in Florida"2 ' sufficient to satisfy due
process. 22 Despite the implications of McGee, the Hanson Court
added that jurisdiction does not automatically attach simply because the state is the center of gravity of the dispute or the most
convenient forum.23
B. Application of Minimum Contacts: Gray v. American Radia-

tor & Standard Sanitary Corp. and Buckeye Boiler v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County
In response to the fresh enunciation of due process standards in
International Shoe and its progeny, state legislatures enacted
broad jurisdictional long-arm statutes.24 After Hanson, state and
federal courts grappled with the constitutional scope of these
statutes for twenty years without receiving more concrete judicial
guidelines from the United States Supreme Court. This resulted
in a generally liberal approach to the exercise of personal jurisdiction and in a plethora of decisions favoring plaintiffs, thus paralleling the trend towards liberal compensation for the products liability plaintiff.25 For example, in Gray v. American Radiator &
parties, the location of witnesses, the law to be applied, and the possible alternative jurisdictions." Kamp, supra note 4, at 31, 33-35. See also Note, Specific
Jurisdiction: Can the Fourth Circuit Approach Survive Woodson? 32 S.C.L.
Rav. 379, 388 (1980).
21. 357 U.S. at 252.
22. Using the Supreme Court's language and analysis in World-Wide, the
trustee in Hanson would not reasonably have anticipated being haled into a
Florida court. See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
23. 357 U.S. at 253.
24. See generally Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MxcH. L. REv. 1028 (1965);
Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV.
909 (1960).
25. "Without rigid jurisdictional restraints, it has been relatively simple for
plaintiffs to join complex groups of defendants, strung out across the country in
a multistate chain of manufacturing and merchandising, into a single suit which
tests (as the theory contemplates) the liability of the product itself, rather than
the conduct of the sellers." Payne, Jurisdiction in Personam: World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 15 FORUM 1023 (1980).
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Standard Sanitary Corp., 8 the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed

the jurisdiction question using the conflicts of law fiction that
equates the place of injury with the place in which the last event
in the transaction occurs.2 The Court interpreted the Illinois
long-arm statute, which confers jurisdiction over in-state tortious
acts, as encompassing tortious acts performed outside the state
that result in injury within the forum.2 In Gray, a boiler exploded in Illinois because of a faulty safety valve that had been
negligently constructed in Pennsylvania and sold to an Ohio defendant that had fitted the valve onto the boiler and shipped it
into Illinois where it was sold. 29 The Court cited convenience to
the defendant and the forum's interest in having the claim litigated in Illinois as motivating factors in its decision to uphold
Illinois' assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant manufacturer.3 0 The Court explained that modern jurisdictional theory
had been relaxed after InternationalShoe and stressed that the
contacts found lacking in McGee were present in Gray.$1 Acknowledging that the record did not demonstrate exactly where

the manufacturer's valves had been marketed, the Court justified
its result on the "reasonable inference"3 2 that the manufacturer
had participated in a stream of commerce connected with Illinois.
The Court also noted that the possible lack of voluntariness in
the manufacturer's participation in Illinois' commerce "should
not matter";33 it concluded, however, that the manufacturer's reasonable expectation that the product would be used in Illinois"
does matter. As manifested in Gray,3 5 lower court decisions ex-

26. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
27. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
28. "We think it is clear that the alleged negligence in manufacturing the
valve cannot be separated from the resulting injury; and that for present purposes,. .. the tort was committed in Illinois." Id. at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
29. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
30. Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
31. Id. at 438-39, 176 N.E.2d at 764. The court was satisfied that "at the
present time it is sufficient if the act or transaction itself has a substantial connection with the State of the forum." Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
32. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
33. "Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture
of products presumably sold in contemplation of use here [in Illinois], it should
not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that
someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this State." Id.
34. Id.
35. The Court in Gray distinguished many of the major cases favoring a
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panding the jurisdiction of the courts continued to surface during
the twenty years after Hanson, though the Supreme Court remained silent on the contacts issue. In Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County," the Supreme Court of California explicitly employed a qualitative analysis to determine the
minimum contacts issue. The Court's test was inherited from McGee: it involved a balancing between "the inconvenience to the
defendant in having to defend itself in the forum State against
both the interest in the plaintiff in suing locally and the interrelated interest of the State in assuming jurisdiction. ' 37 In addition,
the court stressed the fact that it was foreseeable that the product would enter the forum state.3 s Thus, according to the California Supreme Court, a defendant hoping to avoid jurisdiction must
show that it was unforeseeable that his product would enter the
forum state and that litigation in the forum state would severely
inconvenience him3 9 - burdens not mandated by Hanson's "purposeful availment" analysis.

more limited concept of jurisdiction. Id. at 444, 176 N.E.2d at 767. One of these
cases, a pre-Hansondecision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (1956), criticized the broad
concept of state court jurisdicton: "Though the 'minimum contact' theory may
have liberalizing tendencies, it was not so much an innovation on due process as
it was a rephrasing of the prevailing fictional tests ....

."

Id. at 506. The

Erlanger Mills discussion of state sovereignty presaged the Supreme Court's
analysis in World-Wide:
The Constitution ... contemplates that the boundaries between the

states shall have continued significance for some purposes though not for
all. If one State may, without violation of the due process clause, extend
the authority of its courts beyond its boundaries over persons and situations not sufficiently related to that State, the separate identity of the
States will be reduced to a mere fiction.
Id. at 509. See also Kamp, supra note 4, at 37. It is not surprising that a hypothetical articulated in ErlangerMills was adopted by the Supreme Court in its
analysis of foreseeability in World-Wide. See 444 U.S. at 297.
36. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
37. Id. at 899, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
38. Id. at 904, 488 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121. Before World-Wide, several courts equated minimum contacts with foreseeability; minimum contacts
existed if it was foreseeable that tortious activity outside the forum would result
in injury within. See Note, State Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Defendants, 15 TuLSA L. REV., 827, 835 n.48, 852 nn.92 & 93 (1980).
39. 71 Cal. 2d at 905, 488 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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c. A Fresh Response: Kulko v. Superior Court of California
After twenty years of lower federal court decisions, the United
States Supreme Court began to provide additional constitutional
guidelines for jurisdictional analysis.4 In Kulko v. Superior Court
of California,41 the Court held that California's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a father in New York failed International
Shoe's minimum contacts test. The Court refused to allow the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the New York defendant
merely because he sent his child into the forum state, thus causing an "effect" in the forum state.42 This qualitative effects analysis, emphasizing both the results of defendant's activities and the
forum state's interest in having a claim litigated, steers the jurisdictional inquiry away from a simple analysis of defendant's contacts with the forum.4 3 The Court diminished the precedential
impact of McGee by downplaying the idea of convenience and
stressing the fact that the defendant's act was not one which the
defendant could reasonably have expected to result in litigation
40. This activity began when the Supreme Court held that an assertion of
quasi in rem jurisdiction is unconstitutional absent the necessary minimum contacts between the forum state and the person whose property is the subject of
the attachment. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See generally Note,
The Applicability of Shaffer to the Quasi-in-Rem Attachment of Foreigner's
Assets, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note]. The
Shaffer rationale was used in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), the companion case to World-Wide. Rush held unconstitutional a Minnesota court's utilization of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant with no contacts with the
forum. Id. at 322. After Shaffer and Rush, it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction in rem is also unconsitutional without a showing of sufficient minimum contacts. Id. at 328.
41. 435 U.S. 84 (1978). The husband made a special appearance when his
wife attempted to modify their separation agreement in court and moved to
quash service on the grounds that he lacked the necessary contacts with California to justify an assertion of jurisdiction. The trial court's denial of the motion
was sustained by the California Supreme Court. Kulko v. Superior Court of
Calif., 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977). The father had
permitted one child to take up permanent residence with her mother in California and another child flew there to stay with his mother without his father's
permission. The California Supreme Court found that the initial consent
granted by the father constituted a fair and reasonable basis for extending personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 524, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
42. 436 U.S. at 96.
43. Id. at 94. "As in Hanson..., the instant action involves an agreement
that was entered into with virtually no connection with the forum State." Id. at

97.
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in a state three thousand miles away." This idea of foreseeability
would later characterize the due process limitations articulated in
World-Wide.' 5
D. World-Wide and the Limits of Due Process
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson presented an
Oklahoma products liability action brought by private plaintiffs
against Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., the New York retailer of an allegedly defective Audi. Plaintiffs purchased the Audi in New
York and were injured while driving through Oklahoma on their
way to a new residence in Arizona. Plaintiffs joined as defendants
the manufacturer,

Audi;46 Audi's

importer, Volkswagen

of

America, Inc.; and the regional Audi distributor, World-Wide
Volkswagen, a New York corporation. Seaway and World-Wide
challenged the Oklahoma district court's exercise of jurisdiction;
the trial court rejected this challenge and the defendants unsuccessfully attempted to obtain from the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma a writ of prohibition restraining the trial judge.4 7 The

United States Supreme Court granted certiorai 48 and reversed,
holding that, absent evidence of recordable sales or other business
with retail customers in the forum state, a local retailer and regional distributor cannot constitutionally be subjected to in personam jurisdiction. 9
Before addressing respondent's contentions, Mr. Justice White,
chronicling the development of jurisdictional theory since InternationalShoe,50 declared that the due process clause was "an instrument of interstate federalism" 51 and noted that "territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States" 52 were limitations "express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Con44. Id.
45. 444 U.S. at 297.
46. Id. at 288. The manufacturer, Audi, is Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft of Germany.
47. Id. at 289. The Oklahoma Supreme Court applied Oklahoma's long-arm
statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1701.3(a)(4) (1971). Id. at 289-90.
48. 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
49. 444 U.S. at 298.

50. This analysis was similar to McGee's discussion of the modernization of
the United States economy. Id. at 293.

51. Id. at 294.
52. The court considered Hanson's discussion of restrictions on state sovereignty. Id.; see 357 U.S. at 250-51.
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stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. '53 Thus, Justice White
reasoned that minimum contacts analysis may prevent a state
from exercising jurisdiction when the defendant faces no inconvenience from litigation in the forum, the state has a strong interest
in hosting litigation, and the state offers the most convenient forum.5 4 Indeed, the minimum contacts analysis, reflecting the
Court's concern with principles of interstate federalism, performs
two functions: (1) it serves to avoid burdening a defendant with
having to litigate in a distant forum and (2) it "acts to insure that
the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their states as coequal sovereigns in a
' 55
federal system.
World- Wide's minimum contacts analysis was of a quantitative
character. Quantitative analysis necessitates examining the sum
total of a defendant's forum-related activities to determine if the
total number of contacts allows an assertion of personal jurisdiction without violation of due process. Although Justice White
listed the types of contacts that Seaway and World-Wide Volkswagen did not have with Oklahoma, 56 the opinion implied that
the existence of a combination of these contacts might justify an
assertion of jurisdiction. 57 Justice White noted that the situs of
the defective Audi in Oklahoma was "one, isolated occurrence,"58
insignificant as opposed to "efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in
other States."59 This distinction is reminiscent of Hanson's purposeful avaiiment test and may require more than minimal contacts since the privileges and economic benefits accruing to manufacturers and distributors from the use of Oklahoma's highway
53.

444 U.S. at 293.

54. Id. at 294.
55.

Id. at 291-92.

56. Justice White stated:
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no
sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the
privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there
either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated
to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars
at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.

Id. at 295.
57. See Payne, supra note 25, at 1026.
58. 444 U.S. at 295.
59.

Id. at 297.
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system constitute the qualitative contacts needed to pass the
International Shoe test.6 0 The World-Wide Court did, however,
cite Gray for the proposition that even "one, isolated occurrence"
could subject national distributors and foreign manufacturers,
who place goods in the stream of commerce and expect consumption in the forum state, to the forum state's jurisdiction. 1
Thus it seems that Gray retains some vitality notwithstanding
the fact that it involved a single, isolated occurrence.62 WorldWide, however, overruled the concept of foreseeability expressed
in cases such as Buckeye Boiler. Justice White admitted that the
contacts with the forum established by the defendants in Hanson
and Kulko were foreseeable in one sense, but explained that "the
foreseeability. . . critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state." 63
Using World- Wide's definition, foreseeability occurs when 'the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there."" This definition complements Hanson's purposeful availment test because a defendant that purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
60. Kamp, supra note 4, at 44. See also 444 U.S. at 307 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
61. 444 U.S. at 297-98. Cf. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 IlM. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
62. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
63. 444 U.S. at 297.
64. Id. In a three-man dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that International Shoe mandated only that jurisdiction be fair and reasonable and did not
"establish a mechanical test based on the quantum of contacts between a State
and the defendant." Id. at 300. Justice Brennan felt that if certain concerns
were invoked, "the significance of the contacts necessary to support jurisdiction
would diminish." Id. These concerns included: (1) McGee's emphasis on the
state's interest in permitting the litigation to go forward; (2) the convenience to
the defendant in having to defend in a distant forum; and (3) a situation involving a businessman's inability to control the movement of his goods. Id. at 30001, 308-09. Justice Brennan could not reconcile the majority's distinction "between a case involving goods which reach a distant State through a chain of
distribution and a case involving goods which reach the same State because a
consumer, using them as a dealer knew the customer would, took them there."
Id. at 306-07. He felt the majority contradicted itself by citing to Gray in which
the defendant manufacturer "had no more control over which States its goods
would reach than did the petitioners in this case." Id. at 307 n.12.
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E. The HistoricalPerspective After, World-Wide
Earlier due process cases are placed in a new analytical framework by the World-Wide decision. World-Wide interpreted Hanson's territorial restriction analysis in terms of interstate federalism, thus resurrecting Pennoyer's argument that jurisdiction is
limited by the coequal status of states in a federal system. International Shoe's minimum contacts test is utilized by the WorldWide Court in a quantitative, defendant-oriented manner in order to ascertain the procedural fairness that due process requires.
Furthermore, World-Wide's inquiry into whether a defendant
should reasonably foresee litigating in the forum is the logical extension of Hanson's purposeful availment test and Kulko's rejection of a qualitative effects analysis. World-Wide's unique foreseeability test qualifies lower court decisions such as Buckeye
Boiler while lower court holdings based on a "stream of commerce-reasonable expectation" analysis are supported by World
Wide's recognition of Gray. Therefore, World-Wide provides a
fresh perspective which must become part of any minimum contacts analysis applied to a transnational setting.
IM. RECENT DECISIONS

Recent federal court decisions have applied World-Wide to situations involving tortious injuries in the United States resulting
from defective foreign products. The strong concern of federal
courts, sitting as state courts in diversity actions, in providing a
United States forum for litigating these products liability claims
clashes with World-Wide's limited focus on the defendant's contacts with the forum. 5 When confronted with the question of
whether it is constitutional to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations that distribute their products internationally, however,
these courts appear only peripherally concerned with the principles of federalism underlying World-Wide. In these cases, the
courts have emphasized that quantitative minimum contacts
analysis may be necessary to determine foreseeability under the
World-Wide standard.
A.

Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh

Two months after World-Wide, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap65. See Payne, supra note 25, at 1029.

Summer 1981]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

peals decision in Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh"' dealt with a
transnational situation involving an assertion of jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant. The Poyner court was relatively unconcerned
with World-Wide's emphasis on federalism and upheld an assertion of jurisdiction over a German-based firearms manufacturer,
Erma Werke Gmbh (Erma). Plaintiff had sued Erma and Erma's
New York based distributor, L.A. Distributors, Inc., after an
Erma pistol caused gunshot wounds that left plaintiff a paraplegiC.6 7 Plaintiff, alleging both negligence and breach of warranty,

obtained a default judgment against Erma s after Erma failed to
respond to service of process issued pursuant to Kentucky's longarm statute. 9 A motion for summary judgment" was granted on
grounds that Erma lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Kentucky.71 After concluding that the Kentucky long-arm statute
conferred jurisdiction over the German manufacturer, 2 the Sixth
Circuit articulated a three-part test for determining whether an
assertion of personal jurisdiction passes constitutional muster.73
First, the court asked whether Erma purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting business in Kentucky. The court
agreed that Erma had utilized L.A. Distributors as its primary
United States distributor and advertisor, sold its products to a
Kentucky distributor, and maintained a salesman and warehouse
in the Southeast. 4 Second, the Court inquired as to whether the
cause of action arose from defendant's activities in the forum
state. 75 The record disclosed only that L.A. Distributors had sold
66.

618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980).

67. Id. at 1187.
68. Id.
69. Ky. REV. STAT. § 454.210(2)(a) 4-5 (1968) (amended 1980).
70. 618 F.2d at 1187. Erma's insurance company, added as a defendant in a
supplemental complaint, filed the motion for summary judgment. Erma's American-based parent corporation, Lear Siegler, Inc. (LSI), advised Erma not to respond to suit; therefore, Erma did not give its insurance company, Insurance
Company of America, timely notice of the pending litigation. LSI too was added
as defendant and held to be liable under the default judgment of the district
court; however, the Sixth Circuit reversed this decision in Poyner v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 542 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
71. 618 F.2d at 1187.
72. Id. at 1189-90.
73. This test was originally delineated in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco
Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
74. 618 F.2d at 1191.
75. Id.
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the defective pistol to the Nashville salesman and that a Kentucky resident had acquired it; the court, however, found it "more
probable than not that this cause of action arose from Erma's activities in Kentucky.

' 76

The final inquiry concerned whether suffi-

cient contacts existed and permitted the court to resurrect the
federalism concerns articulated in World-Wide. Yet the court
not only recognized the significance of McGee's emphasis on convenience to the defendant but also found "the interest of the
commonwealth in adjudicating this dispute to be an important
factor in the resolution of the issue at bar."7 81 Then, paralleling
the McGee discussion of modern commercial and technological
advances, the court acknowledged that the United States was a
center of international trade and concluded that the rapid growth
in markets, transportation, and communication diminished the
burden on a foreign enterprise forced to adjudicate in a state in
which it engages in business activity.79 The Sixth Circuit noted
that a balancing process,80 reminiscent of the process articulated
in Buckeye Boiler, was the proper method of evaluating due process in this transnational arena. World-Wide's unilateral focus on
the defendant was thus ignored.81 Moreover, the court explained
that World-Wide's emphasis on federalism was somewhat inapplicable to an international setting because "[w]hile minimum
contacts also serve the related function of checking the jurisdictional reach of coequal sovereigns in a federal system, the impact
of such a purpose is minimized in an international setting as opposed to interstate operations." 82
B. Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc.
Unlike the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit in
Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc. 8 found Justice White's foreseeability
76. Id. The court later explained that the fact that the last recorded sale of
the gun occurred in Tennessee did not affect its decision. Id. at 1192.

77. Id. at 1191.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. "Given Erma's contacts with Kentucky and balancing the plaintiff's interest... to adjudicate his cause and obtain effective relief as against Erma's

burden of litigating this matter in Kentucky, we conclude that it is reasonable
and fair to require Erma to litigate the action in Kentucky." Id.

81. 444 U.S. at 294.
82.

618 F.2d at 1192.

83. 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980).
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analysis apropos. After suffering burns from a defective lighter,
plaintiff sued both Tokai-Sekei, a Japanese cigarette lighter manufacturer and Scripto, Inc., its United States distributor.8 The
court considered the quantum of Tokai-Sekei's contacts with
Texas and set forth a litany of negatives: the Japanese manufacturer had no office or agent in Texas; no record of doing business
in the United States or with a United States company (except
Scripto, which was to be Tokai-Sekei's exclusive distributor of the
lighter); and no manufacturing, assembling, selling, or dealing organizations in this country.8 5 The record, however, reflected that
Scripto had purchased several million lighters from Tokai-Sekei
in Japan and marketed three to four million lighters per year in
the United States." The Fifth Circuit agreed that Tokai-Sekei
had reason to know the defective lighter would reach Texas and
found this constructive knowledge sufficient to subject Tokai7
Sekei to personal jurisdiction.
The court articulated both Hanson's purposeful availment test
and McGee's discussion of modern transportation and commerce,88 but based its decision on the stream of commerce dictum

84. Scripto cross-claimed against Tokai-Sekei and also filed a third-party
complaint for contribution and indemnity against Holland-Hessol Co., Inc.,

manufacturer of Mrs. Oswalt's pajamas. Holland-Hessol then filed a third-party
complaint against Ameretex, manufacturer of the fabric used in the pajamas. Id.

at 193. Consequently, Oswalt and Scripto agreed to settle between themselves
and fied a Joint Motion for Permission to Appeal the Texas district court's
dismissal of Tokai-Sekei for lack of personal jurisdiction, but their attempt at
obtaining an appeal of an interlocutory order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

(1976) was denied by the Fifth Circuit. Id. They were granted their joint motion
to sever Scripto's actions against Holland-Hessol and Ameretex; a new order re-

peating the dismissal of Tokai-Sekei for lack of personal jurisdiction was entered. Id. The district court judgment dismissing Tokai-Sekei, however, did not

have a FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate. In addition the court failed to make any
§ 1292(b) representations and there was not a final order to dismiss Oswalt's
claim against Scripto. Id. at 194. The court found that the agreement between
the Oswalts and Scripto was tantamount to a stipulation of dismissal under FEW.

R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii). Id. As a result, the court concluded that the dismissal of
Tokai-Sekei terminated the district court's litigation and was appealable. Id. at

195.
85. Id. at 197.
86. Id. at 198. Mrs. Oswalt purchased the lighter, which had been supplied
by a Midland, Texas wholesaler, from Mr. Oswalt's daughter.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 199.
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in World-Wide.89 The Fifth Circuit failed to consider that WorldWide's "stream of commerce-reasonable expectations" language
leads to the conclusion that a product's destination may be just as
foreseeable to a foreign manufacturer as it is to a local retailer or
regional distributor.90 Instead, the court said Tokai-Sekei should
reasonably have anticipated being haled into a Texas court 91 because the lighters were delivered to Scripto with the understanding that they would be delivered to United States retail outlets.92
The court proclaimed that this case fit "like a glove" 93 Justice
White's manufacturing and distribution hypothetical in WorldWide.9 4 Unlike Seaway (the local operator) and World-Wide
Volkswagen (the regional distributor), Tokai-Sekei failed to limit
its distribution system to avoid exposure to the jurisdiction of the
Texas courts.95
The Fifth Circuit qualified dicta in its previous decisions without considering whether these decisions were in accord with
World-Wide.98 The court felt that the citation to Gray at the end
of World- Wide's "stream of commerce-reasonable expectations"
analysis reinforced its decision. The court found further rein97
forcement from its decision in Coulter v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,

which also cited Gray.98 The Oswalt court strategically utilized
the Gray opinion, reasoning that Tokai-Sekei's contacts with
Texas were more definite than the contacts found in Gray.99 This
reasoning anchored the Oswalt opinion within Gray's controversial holding that one isolated occurrence in the forum state may
justify a state's assertion of jurisdiction.

89. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
90. Professor Payne suggested that World-Wide's "stream of commerce-reasonable expectations" analysis supports such a conclusion. See Payne, supra
note 25, at 1027.
91. 616 F.2d at 200.
92. Id. at 199.
93. Id. at 200.
94. Id. at 199-200. See discussion of Justice White's manufacturing and dis-

tribution hypothetical in World-Wide.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 201 & n.14.
426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970). In Coulter, the court stated that "it is

sufficient to impose jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer if he introduces his
products into the 'stream of interstate commerce with reason to know or expect
616 F.2d at 200.
that his product would eventually be brought into Texas.
98. Id. at 201-02.

99. Id.

Summer 1981]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

C. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.
Like the Fifth Circuit in Oswalt, the United States District
Court of New Jersey utilized World-Wide's concept of foreseeablity in its decision in DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers,Inc.200 In

DeJames, the court found that Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engine
Company Ltd. was not amenable to suit for injuries caused by
defective conversion work on a ship moored in New Jersey.1 01 The
defective conversion work had been performed by Hitachi in Japan.1 0 2 The court first focused on the fact that the ship's situs in
New Jersey at the time of the injury failed to provide sufficient
contacts,10 8 since Hitachi did not do business in New Jersey,

maintain an office or agent there, or employ any salesman to sell
its product there.1 04 Plaintiff proferred

05

a stream of commerce

rationale to argue that the nature of Hitachi's business, which involved work on isolated sailing vessels, meant that Hitachi

"should expect to be haled into court in any forum where a defect
in one of its ships causes harm."01 The court responded that
Hitachi had not placed its products into the forum through use of

a specific, planned distributive scheme and that Hitachi did not
envision marketing or distributing the vessel commercially.1 07
100. 491 F.Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980).
101. Plaintiff DeJames sued Hitachi and three charterers of the ship, invoking the district court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). Id.
at 1277. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had contracted to convert the ship into
an automobile carrier and that as a result of the work performed, he incurred
injuries while working on the vessel docked in Camden, New Jersey. Hitachi
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of sufficient contacts with New Jersey
to meet due process standards. Id.
102. Id.
103. Since this suit involved a federal.claim, the court noted that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment controlled, but that this did not undermine the application of InternationalShoe, a fourteenth amendment case. Id. at
1278.
104. Id. at 1279.
105. Plaintiff relied on the following pre-World-Wide decisions: Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Smiley v. Gemini Inv. Corp.,
333 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F.
Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965). Id.
106. Id.
107. Tihere was no distributive or marketing scheme whereby Hitachi
sought to have the vessel in question marketed and sold through channels
to a New Jersey resident. Hitachi's sole involvement with the vessel was
under a contract made in Japan between itself and the ship's owners....
It had no control over the ship once it left Japan. It made no decision to
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Finally, comparing DeJames and World-Wide on the facts, the
court found that Hitachi had no reason to foresee litigation in
New Jersey as a result of its work in Japan. 10 8 Unlike the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Erma, the New Jersey District Court
emphasized the premise that territorial restrictions on state
courts still exist,109 thus echoing World- Wide's reliance on
Hanson.
D. Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer
The analysis in Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer 10 does not significantly depart from that in Oswalt or
DeJames, yet it indicates an application of World-Wide to cases
in which the regional distributor 'has the "ability to control its
contacts with the forum asserting jurisdiction and the benefits it
derived from that conduct." ' ' Plant Food, a Montana-based fertilizer dealer, placed an order for some ammonium nitrate fertilizer from a Washington corporation, Wolfkill, which ordered the
fertilizer from a Washington corporation, A.R. Smith and Co.,
which in turn purchased the product from Pillsbury of Canada
Ltd." 2 Pillsbury's fertilizer, shipped via a sight draft bill of lading
listing Pillsbury as shipper and Smith as consignee, was mislabelled. The fertilizer caused extensive property damage to Plant
Food's own bins and fertilizer"13 after it was unloaded into bins
already containing ammohium nitrate. Relying on the Montana
long-arm statute11 4 and declaring that the action did indeed
sound in tort, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision for the plaintiff. 1 5
send the ship into New Jersey, nor did it seek to benefit from the laws of
New Jersey or derive any profit there, either directly or indirectly.
Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1280-81.
110. 633 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1980).
111. Id. at 159.
112. Id. at 156. Pillsbury purchased the fertilizer from Love Feeds, Ltd. of
Alberta, Canada.
113. Id. at 157. The mislabelled amnmonium nitrate was really ammonium
sulfate and urea.
114. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 4B (1979), cited in 633 F.2d at 158, confers personal
jurisdiction for the commission of any act that results in accrual within the state
of a tort action.
115. Id. at 157. Plant Food sued Wolfkill for damages in Montana district
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The Plant Food court's due process discussion was brief but
direct. The court found that Pillsbury had voluntarily entered the
Montana market by shipping a mislabelled product into the forum state.1 " More importantly, the fact that Pillsbury, unlike the
defendants in World-Wide, controlled its contacts with the forum
state by choosing shipping destinations was found to be dispositive on the contacts issue. 1 7 The court determined that the bill of
lading was evidence of Pillsbury's control and also demonstrated
Pillsbury's knowledge that the product was destined for Montana." 8 Even though Pillsbury might not have known the product
was defective, it was ready to reap financial benefits from its
Montana activities and thus should have foreseen the possibility
of litigating in Montana." 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the advent of these recent decisions involving foreign corporate defendants, it appears that World-Wide's use of minimum
contacts analysis to further interstate federalism will not provide
as much of an impact in international products liability as will
World-Wide's foreseeability doctrine and its quantitative inquiry
into defendant's forum-related activities. These latter two components of World-Wide are the basis for the different results
achieved by the Supreme Court in the World-Wide decision itself
and in Justice White's hypothetical. Likewise, these two compocourt on a claim of breach of warranty of description and implied warranty of

merchantibility. Wolfkill filed a third-party complaint against Smith and Pillsbury. Pillsbury presented an employee "kffidavit to prove that after receiving
shipping instructions from Smith, Love actually shipped the fertilizer although
the bill of lading showed Pillsbury as shipper. After the court denied Pillsbury's

motion to dismiss based on this affidavit, Pillsbury filed a third-party complaint
against Love, and Smith cross-claimed against Pillsbury. Plant Food received a

judgment against Wolfkill for partial damages. Then the court granted summary
judgment to Smith against Wolfkill on Wolfkill's third-party complaint. Id. Fi-

nally, the court granted summary judgment against Pillsbury on the basis of
both Wolfkill's third-party complaint and Smith's cross-complaint. Id. In the

process both Wolfkill's motion for judgment against Smith and/or Love and
Pillsbury's motion for a new trial were denied. Pillsbury appealed. Id.
116. Id. at 158-59.
117. Id. at 159.

118. "The bill of lading shows conclusively that Pillsbury knew, at least
when it accepted the shipping instructions, that the product it sold was destined
for Montana." Id.
119. Id.
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nents produced the different results in Oswalt and DeJames.
Oswalt, which is gaining precedential strength,120 faithfully extends the World-Wide analysis and develops a stream of commerce rationale to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
claims against foreign manufacturers based on product-related
injuries occurring in the forum. 121 Oswalt's stream of commerce
analysis stands in opposition to the argument that a foreign manufacturer which utilizes a national distributor as a conduit for the
marketing of its products has no expectation that its products
will be purchased by consumers in the forum state.1 22 Furthermore, Oswalt demonstrates that a quantitative consideration of a
foreign defendant's contacts with the forum state is integral to
120. See Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 499 F.
Supp. 829, 835 (D. Or. 1980); Red River Transp. & Dev. Co. v. Custom Airmotive, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 425, 428 (D.N.D. 1980); Dotson v. Fluor Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 313, 317 (W.D. Tex. 1980); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F.
Supp. 1276, 1279 (D.N.J. 1980); Long v. The Vessel "Miss Ida Ann," 490 F.
Supp. 210, 213 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
Cascade Steel and Dotson are similar to Oswalt in that they involve foreign
corporation defendants. Both decisions relied on Oswalt's interpretation of
World-Wide. 499 F. Supp. at 835; 492 F. Supp. at 37. In Cascade Steel, the
Oregon District Court dismissed an antitrust suit against Japanese steel mills
that "were aware of the ultimate destination of the steel sold to the [Japanese]
trading companies, but ... did not solicit sales from Oregon nor did they have
any control over where the steel was to be shipped." 499 F. Supp. at 842 (emphasis added). The Japanese trading companies owned subsidiaries doing business in Oregon. Id. at 836.
Furthermore, in Dotson, a Texas district court found it constitutional to assert jurisdiction over a Saudi Arabian corporation that recruited Texas residents
for employment in Saudi Arabia. The action involved a breach of contract and
misrepresentation by the foreign corporation that "purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of employing Texas residents." 492 F. Supp. at 317.
121. The court stated:
[T]hese facts place this case squarely within the dictum of World-Wide
Volkswagen implying that jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer such as
Audi is constitutional. By utilizing the distribution network in the United
States established by Scripto, Tokai-Sekei has made efforts to serve indirectly the market for its products in Texas. Tokai-Sekei, precisely as the
dictum describes, 'delivered its products into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state.'
616 F.2d at 200.
122. The argument remains that a foreign manufacturer utilizing a local or
regional distributor has no reason to expect its products will be purchased by
consumers in a forum state outside the commercial range of the distributor's
operations. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.

Summer 1981]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

any finding of foreseeability under the World-Wide standard.2
Whether a court chooses to use a stream of commerce analysis or
a quantitative analysis of defendant's contacts with the forum, a
finding of foreseeability under the World-Wide standard produces such consistent results that it is fair to summon a foreign
manufacturer into the United States to account for the distribution of its product through the activities of a national distributor.
Oswalt's extension of liability to a foreign manufacturer accords with World-Wide; the World-Wide opinion, however, also
emphasizes the need to minimize the burden of litigation in distant forums on local and regional domestic businesses. 24
DeJames fills this gap by focusing on the defendant and expands
World- Wide's protective scope to preclude assertions of jurisdiction against small foreign businesses that do not expect their
product to enter a United States distribution network.125 The
World-Wide foreseeability criteria defined the line between the
protection afforded Hitachi in DeJames 28 and the protection denied Pillsbury in Plant Food. 27 Both the Plant Food and

DeJames courts acknowledged Justice White's statement in
World-Wide that the guarantees of the due process clause bestow
"a degree of predictabilility to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit." 28 The "minimum assurance" language gave rise to the Ninth Circuit's 1 29 and the New Jersey Dis-

trict Court's'30 characterization of a "control" element in minimum contacts analysis. Like the defendants in World-Wide, the
defendant in DeJames, which did not control the movement of its
123. See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
124. See 444 U.S. at 294 and text accompanying note 137 infra.
125. See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra.
126. 491 F. Supp. at 1279.
127. 633 F.2d at 159.
128. 444 U.S. 297. Unlike the DeJames court, the PlantFood court did not
incorporate this language directly into its opinion; it did, however, use this reasoning in reviewing Pillsbury's activities. "When it knew the fertilizer was bound
for Montana, Pillsbury could have objected or made other arrangements if it
found exposure to Montana's long-arm statute unacceptable." 633 F.2d at 159.
The Fifth Circuit in Oswalt also recognized that defendant "Tokai-Sekei's distribution system was not structured to gain some 'minimum assurance".., that

the lighters would be sold in Texas." 616 F.2d at 200.
129. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
130. 633 F.2d 155, 159 (9th Cir. 1980).
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product, escaped the reach of New Jersey's personal jurisdiction.
In contrast, the regional distributor in PlantFood did control the
entry of the fertilizer into Montana, and thus it was appropriate
to give Plant Food its day in court. Delineating a "control" element is, therefore, a valuable tool in applying World- Wide's minimum contacts analysis to a transnational setting."' 1
Though the Oswalt and DeJames courts focused on the quantitative crux of the World- Wide opinion, the Erma court gave more
attention to Justice White's interstate federalism discussion:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; [and] even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes
act to divest
13 2
the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
The Sixth Circuit opinion in Erma pragmatically considers the
applicability of World-Wide's interstate federalism philosophy in
a case involving a foreign defendant.13 3 In holding that plaintiff's

injuries arose from the foreign defendant's activities in Kentucky,
the court avoided forcing a Kentucky plaintiff to seek redress in a
distant foreign forum, despite the fact that the injuries plaintiff
received in Kentucky were the result of a series of events set in
motion in Germany.13 4 By limiting the underlying federalism concerns in World-Wide to cases involving domestic defendants, the
Sixth Circuit resurrected the two plaintiff-oriented considerations
cited in McGee and in Justice Brennan's World-Wide dissent:
convenience and state interest.3 5
If a court follows Erma's interpretation of World-Wide's federalism argument, it avoids denying plaintiff a day in court when
there is no alternative forum in this country. Under these same
circumstances, if Justice White's "interstate federalism" language
is used (as it must be if minimum contacts analysis is to check
the jurisdictional reach of coequal sovereign states), then an assertion of jurisdiction based on the necessity of giving the plain131. The Oregon District Court also used this "control" characterization in
its analysis in Cascade Steel. See note 120 supra.

132. 444 U.S. at 294.
133. 616 F.2d at 198-99.

134. Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh, 618 F.2d at 1191.
135. Id. at 1192; see note 64 supra.
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tiff an opportunity to litigate will be defeated by World-Wide's
quantitative inquiry into defendant's contacts with the forum. 136
Yet if a court confronted with these circumstances justifies application of Erma's qualitative analytical approach because the case
involves the jurisdictional reach of a state into another country
(not into another coequal state), the court can circumvent WorldWide's emphasis on the number of contacts defendant had with
the forum and concomitantly provide plaintiff with a forum in the
United States. The result, however, is dictated by World-Wide's
federalism mandate: the jurisdictional question is resolved at the
expense of state sovereignty.

A complementary consideration follows: by adhering to World136. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court suggested
that a state's exercise of in rem jurisdiction may be constitutional when defendant's lack of amenability to suit in other forums would deny plaintiff an opportunity to litigate.
Shaffer provides a hint of this special state interest in its reference to the
"[s]tate's strong interest in assuring the marketability of property within
its borders." Realizing that it was frequently inadequate to base in rem
and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction upon the fiction that anyone claiming property within a state availed himself of forum benefits, the Court utilized the
concept of state's interest in marketability of land as additional justification for the exercise of jurisdiction in cases where the defendant held
property within the state, and was not amenable to suit in other forums.
Shaffer's approval of the state interest doctrine is thus limited to cases of
"jurisdiction by necessity," in which the ultimate consideration is to provide the plaintiff with at least one possible forum for his litigation.
Note, supra note 40, at 409.
Indeed, Justice Marshall's footnote gave vitality to a jurisdiction by necessity
argument, for he stated that "[Shaffer] does not raise, and we therefore do not
consider, the question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State
is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. Yet Shaffer found that adjudicating interests in property demands the same due process standards for purposes of minimum contacts
analysis as adjudicating interests of people who own that property. If an exercise
of in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant violates due process,
then an in rem assertion of jurisdiction over property owned by that defendant
is equally unconstitutional. See note 40 supra. Therefore, Justice White's "interstate federalism" language in World-Wide, which prohibits in personam jurisdiction based solely on the necessity of providing defendant with some forum,
should logically extend to Shaffer-type in rem proceedings. Thus, World-Wide
indirectly answers the question posed by the Shaffer footnote: Minimum contacts analysis, remaining faithful to the rigid defendant-oriented focus of WorldWide, may "divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment" in both in
personam and in rem actions, even if to do so would deny plaintiff his day in
court. 444 U.S. at 294.
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Wide's defendant-oriented focus, the products liability policy of
compensating the plaintiff is diminished. Indeed, Justice White
indicated that rejection of a Buckeye Boiler-type foreseeability
standard avoided implying that [e]very seller of chattels would in
effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process."'187 Yet
Justice White's statement may merely rephrase an aspect of
products liability theory.'" As DeJames demonstrates, a denial of
jurisdiction based on the restrictive language in World-Wide discourages smaller foreign businesses which, like Hitachi, have direct and indirect income resulting from exposure of their work in
ports all over the world, from increasing prices and sharing the
commercial risks between the manufacturer and the public. As a
result, plaintiffs like DeJames must bear the expense of travel
abroad or forego their claims. Nevertheless, to obtain a different
result would require some independent assumptions as are posited by the court in Erma; it was similar lower court ventures into
due process analysis that prompted Supreme Court responses in
Kulko and World-Wide. 13 9 What is needed are further Supreme
Court formulae that analyze jurisdictional assertions over foreign
products liability defendants in the context of World-Wide's due
process limits and also consider the whole foreign defendant issue
in the perspective of the Supreme Court's current federalism
philosophy.
John Russell Heldman

137. Id. at 296.

138. See Payne, supra note 25, at 1025.
139. See text accompanying notes 26-39 supra.

